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Context: Operating System Kernels
An Example of Resource Monopolization
Proposition: Extend L4 IPCs
Expected Benefits
• Safety: Prevent malicious threads from 
monopolizing drivers
• QoS Management: Accounting and admission 
control would allow resource reservation and real-
time guarantees
• All privileged code in kernel
• Communication via method calls
• Unified drivers interface (IOS)
• Minimal kernel
• Communication via synchronous IPCs
• Userland privileges managed by capabilities
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IPC Extension for Resource Control
CFSE 2011
Monolithic Kernels L4 µ-kernel
Motivation
In most operating systems, userland
processes have unrestricted access to
hardware drivers, by system calls in
monolithic kernels or IPCs in µ-kernels such
as L4. This unrestricted access can often
allow malicious software to force a denial
of service on the driver or strongly impact
its quality of service.
To mitigate this safety issue without
impacting much drivers code, our approach
is to extend L4 IPCs by adding a control
layer to IPCs aimed at drivers.
This would allow admission control to the
driver, as well as accounting and managing
the driver's occupation by user processes.
 The quality of service provided by the driver to 















Delay between application deadlines 
and actual processing
Normal Application Alone
Normal Application + 
Malicious Application
Open Questions
• How about resource control in higher layers?
• Which uniform resource reservation model?
• Robustness of managed IPCs to malicious users?
